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The Intricacies of Income-In-
Respect-of Decedent 
-by Neil E. Harl* 
 Property held until death ordinarily is entitled to a new income tax basis, determined as 
of the date of death of the owner.1 However, property defined as “income-in-respect-of-
decedent” at the death of the property owner is not eligible to receive a new income tax 
basis as of the death of the owner of the property.2  With the run-up in property values in 
recent years, the result can be a sharp difference in future income tax liability, depending 
upon the classification of the property at death. Without much doubt, the federal income tax 
provisions (as well as state income tax rules in most states), in short, strongly encourage 
retention of highly appreciated property until death. Likewise, the rules separating income-
in-respect-of-decedent property from other assets have great significance in planning for 
the disposition of assets at death.
 This issue has been affected by the changing practices in selling grain, livestock and 
other farm products with the practices not fully reflected in drawing the lines between 
property that is classified as subject to income-in-respect-of-decedent rules and  those not 
so classified.
Share rents: a troublesome area
 Share rents held by a non-materially participating decedent at death or share rents which 
the decedent had a right to receive at the time of death for economic activities occurring 
before death are generally income-in-respect-of-decedent taxable on sale by the estate or 
other successor.3 However, a landlord’s share of rental items is not treated as income-in-
respect-of-decedent if the decedent was a “materially participating” landlord. If this issue 
is raised, as a matter of pre-death or post-death planning, it should be noted that material 
participation by a landlord creates possible liability for self-employment taxes, even after 
the landlord is retired and receiving self-employment benefits. 
 Farm operators and materially participating landlords do not usually encounter income-
in-respect-of-decedent problems.
Property sold at the time of  death
 Gain from the sale of property may produce income-in-respect-of-decedent where the 
sale is completed by the personal representative and there are no substantive acts yet to 
be performed.4 In order for a sale to have ripened to the point where a decedent has the 
right to the  proceeds on the date of death, two conditions must be met – (1) there must be 
a legally binding contract and (2) the decedent must have performed the substantive (as 
opposed to the ministerial) acts required  as preconditions of sale.
______________________________________________________________________ 
* Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Emeritus Profes sor of 
Economics, Iowa State University; member of the Iowa Bar.
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In conclusion
 With the shifts occurring in grain sales, it is likely that questions 
will be raised as to which sales will receive a new income tax basis; 
the pressure to qualify for a new basis at death will mount inasmuch 
as the grain usually has a zero value for cash method taxpayers.
END NOTES
 1  I.R.C. §1014(a)(1).  The three exceptions are listed in I.R.C. § 
1014(a)2), (a)(3), (a)(4).
 2  I.R.C. § 691(a)(1).
 3  Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173. See Davison v. United 
States, 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). 
See also Estate of Gavin v. United States, 113 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 
1997) (no mention of whether lease was material participation or 
non-material participation in nature).
 4  Rev. Rul. 78-32, 1978-1 C.B. 198; Ltr. Rul. 9023012, March 
6, 1990 (death before mortgage commitment obtained).
 5 Estate of Napolitano v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-316. 
 6  Ltr. Rul. 200744001, July 18, 2007. See Harl, “When Does a 
Pre-death Sale Not Produce Income in Respect of Decedent?” 21 
Agric. L. Dig. 17 (2010).
 7  Estate of Peterson v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 630(1980), aff’d, 667 
F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981).
 8  Of course, state regulators have a stake in all of this as well.
 9  See Holt v. United States, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,929 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (installment notes received by married taxpayers 
on sale of community property were income-in-respect-of-decedent 
and not entitled to new basis at death). 
 In one case, the  buyer would not accept title  unless clouds 
on title were cured or a purchase price adjustment was made; 
the item was not income-in-respect-of-decedent.5 In another, a 
gas pipeline was discovered and caused a delay in closing as the 
resulting issues were resolved.6   
 In one of the  few cases involving farm property (feeder calves), 
a sales contract entered into before death  required that the  calves 
be heavier in weight  than proved to be the case; however, the 
estate proceeded to return the calves to the feedlots and the 
calves, weeks later, met the contract specifications. The significant 
economic contributions by the estate in increasing the weights of 
the animals were sufficient for the animals to meet the contract 
terms.7 
Sale of grain 
 There have been relatively few litigated cases involving grain 
sales. The general belief has been that grain sales after death 
produce income-in-respect-of-decedent. However, in recent years 
some grain sales have taken on a different character where the 
grain is deposited at the grain elevator or other buyer’s facilities 
with the understanding that the seller could initiate the sale later 
as the price settles at an  acceptable level (if it does). The grain, 
residing in the buyer’s storage facilities, may still be owned by the 
seller at the time of seller’s death or the buyer may have assumed 
possession of the grain but the seller still has not been paid. In 
that case, the seller has the dominant stake in the grain with the 
grain still unsold.8
Installment sales
 Installment contracts or notes may also create income-in-
respect-of-decedent.9 
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BANkRuPTCy
CHAPTER 12
 DISMISSAL. The debtor was a trust which the trust principal 
characterized as a business trust; however, the court declined to 
rule on whether the debtor qualified for Chapter 12 because other 
issues resulted in the same outcome as if the debtor was ineligible 
for Chapter 12. The trustee filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 
12 case for several other reasons: (1) the plan was untimely filed, 
(2) the debtor failed to answer questions from the trustee at the 
meeting of creditors, and (3) the court had already granted the 
debtor’s landlord relief from the automatic stay to terminate the 
debtor’s lease which was the most important asset held by the 
debtor. Section 1208 provides that the court may dismiss a chapter 
12 case for “cause”: “(c) On request of a party in interest, and 
after notice and a hearing, the court may dismiss a case under this 
chapter for cause, including —(1) unreasonable delay, or gross 
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mismanagement, by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; . . . 
(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1221 of this title; . . . 
and (9) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of 
a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation . . ..” Section 1221 provides 
“The debtor shall file a plan not later than 90 days after the order 
for relief under this chapter, except that the court may extend such 
period if the need for an extension is attributable to circumstances 
for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable.” The 
court found that the debtor’s principal had suffered a head injury 
but noted that no request for an extension of time to file the plan 
was made. Thus, the court held that the debtor’s failure to timely 
file a plan or request an extension was grounds for dismissing the 
case. The debtor filed a plan in opposition to the trustee’s motion 
but the court held that the plan was completely insufficient to be 
considered a reviewable plan. Thus, the failure to file a meaningful 
plan was another reason to dismiss the case. The court found that 
the debtor’s principal’s refusal to answer questions from the trustee 
at the creditors’ meeting was not based on any right of the debtor 
and constituted unreasonable delay; thus, the court held that the case 
should be dismissed for unreasonable delay. Finally, the court found 
